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If the  goal of economic development  is to  promote  human
welfare, the most efficient focus of development efforts is in
very  low-income developing countries.  There the payoff  in
improved social indicators that measure human welfare is higher
than it would be for similar efforts in middle-income countries.
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This  paper  - a product  of  the  Research  Advisory  Staff,  Ofiice  of  thc  Vice  Presidenlt,  Dcvelopmcnt
Economics  - was  prepared  for  the  Confcrencc  on  Historical  Perspectives  on  thc  Internattionial  Conver-
gence  of  Productivity  held  in April  1992.  Copies  are available  free  from  the  World  Bank,  IXI  8  H Street
NW,  Washington,  DC20433.  PleasecontactJeanGrayPonchamni,  roonmS3-033,  cxtension:  3(10  2(April
1992,  40  pages,  including  tables).
Most  analysis  of  the  convergence  of  productivity  tion  by  income  level  and  region  reveals  a diver-
addresses  industrial  countries.  Ingram  takes  a  gence  in growth  rates  amonig  developing  countrm
broader  approach  to measures  of  perfonnailce.  groups  anld betwcnl  those  groups  atli  higil-
income  counitries.
For  one  thing,  he  analyzes  some  measures  ol
productivity  but  focuses  farmore  on  social  However,  the  evidence  shows  strong  conver-
indicators  that  are  not  narrowly  economic,  eince across  thc  sample  for  several  social
including:  indicators  that  arc  good  measures  ol hfumani
welfare.  Four  social  indicators  -- life  expect-
•  Indices  of  outcome,  such  as  life  expectancy.  ancy,  caloric  inlake,  primary  enrollmenit  ratios.
o  Indices  of  the  availability  of  inputs,  such  as  and  urbanizatior  --  show  evidence  of  conver-
doctors  per  capita.  gence  for  evenr  convergence  index  used.  Tlk o
o  Indices  that  can  be  either  inputs  or  out-  social  indicators  --  labor  torce  patnicipatlio
comes,  such  as per  capita  caloric  intake  of  food.  rates  and  defense  spending  as  a share  of GNP  --
- Measures  of  govemment  spending  patterns.  show  no  cvidenc_  of  convergence  by any  index
used.  The  othcr  I0) social  indicators  show  soNmc
Moreover,  he  examines  a large  universc  of  cvidence  of  convcrgence;  social  spending  as a
countrics:  21  high-income  or  industrial  countrics  percentage  of  GNP  is the  next  most  convergent
and  up to  88 developing  countries  (depending  on  of  thc  remaining  in(dicaitors.
the  availability  of  data).  Some  data  cover  the
entire  period,  1960-85;  some  cover  only  a few  Social  indicator  levels  are olten  closcly
years  in  that  period.  related  to GDP  levels,  but  other  factors  arc  a so
clearly  It work,  including  the  transmission  of
According  to  Ingram,  gaps  in  per  capita  knowledge,  informationi,  and  new  technologies
GDP  have  incrcased  among  low-,  middle-.  and  across  national  borders.
high-income  countrics.  '[he  range  of  per  capita
GDP  growth  rates  in developinLg  countries  has  Ingram's  main  conclusion:  a given  absolute
widened  as  well.  or  proportional  increase  in per  capila  (Gl)P in
very  low-income  developing  countries  is genCr
Ingram  finds  that  cvidence  does  not  indicate  all)  associated  with  greater  improvements  in  the
a convergence  of  productivity  levels  across  the  social  indicators  that  mcasure  human  wclfarc
sample  of  countri^~s.  Differences  in  absolute  than  is  a similar  increase  in middle-incomc
levels  of  productivity  are  increasing,  not  decreas-  developing  countries.
ing  - among  the  developing  countrics,  and
between  developing  and  industrial  countries.  To  the  extcnt  that  improving  knelfare  is the
objective  of  development  efforls,  it  is most
There  is  some  convergence  in  average  efficient  to  focus  such  cltorits on  low-inconme
productivity  growth  rates  between  developing  developing  countries.
and  industrial  countries,  but  modest  disaggrega-
i The Policy Recearch Working  PaperSeTicsdissrciinales  the findinrs  of vork unider  w1  int  n  Ran  k  Anohjecit\  c ol th  serw
is to get thesc  findings out  quickly,  even  if  presentations  are less  than  fuill  piohNhed  Iie  liCilnigs.  lliter  Talett'ns.  and
conclusions in thcsc papers do not necessajily reprerent official Bank policy
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*  This paper was prepared for  the Conference on  Historical Perspectives
on the  International Convergence of  Productivity. The author is  indebted to
Anupa  Bhaumik  and  Shane  Rosenthal  for  statistical  support,  and  has
benefitted from  the  comments of  his  conference colleagues, especially  Ed
Wolff, on an earlier draft of this paper.Most of the analysis of convergence of productivity
addresses some aspect of it in industrialized countries.  The
approach here is broader in two respects.  First, although some
information is presented on productivity measures, much of the
data analyzed here deals with other measures of performance which
will be referred to collectively as social indicators.  These
indicators are not narrowly economic and include indices of
outcomes, such as life expectancy; indices of the availability ot
inputs, such as doctors per capita; indices which could be
labelled as inputs or outcomes, such as per capita caloric intake
of food; and measures of government expenditure patterns.
Second, the universe of countries examined is large and includes
21 high income or industrialized countries and up to 88
developing countries, depending on the availability of data for
particular variables and time periods.  The years covered for
each variable fall within the period, 1960 to 1985, with a few
variables covering virtually the whole interval and some others
available for only a few years within this period.
To briefly summarize the results of the analysis, the
evidence does not .ndicete that there is convergence in
productivity levels across the sample of countries analyzed.
Differences in absolute levels of productivity are increasing and
not decreasing.  This is true within the group of developing
countries and between developing and industrial countries.  There
is some convergence in average productivity growth rates between
developing and industrial countries, but modest disaggregation by
income level and region reveals a divergence in growth rates2
among developing country groups and between these groups and high
income countries.
The evidence does indicate that there is strong convergence
across the sample for several social indicators that are good
measures of human welfare.  Some other social indicators,
however, show little evidence of convergence and their levels
increase linearly (or  more than linearly) with GDP per capita
measures.  And still other indicators show moderate degrees of
convergence.
One basic conclusion from this analysis is that a given
absolute or proportional increase in per capita GDP in very low
income developing countries is generally associated with greater
improvements in the social indicators that measure human welfare
than a similar increase in per capita GDP in middle income
developing countries.  To the extent that improving welfare is
the objective of development efforts, it is efficient to focus
such efforts on low income developing countries.
PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES
There are many possible measures of economic performance,
and a good survey is provided by Usher  (Reference 7).  Because it
has been widely used in similar studies, the measure of
productivity used here is the Heston-Summers purchasing power
parity per capita GDP measured in constant 1985 prices.  The data
are taken from the World Bank Economic and Social Data Base and
are available since 1960 for 21 high income or industrial
countries and 88 developing countries.  To facilitate analysis,3
the 21 high income countries have been placed in one group  (HI),
and the 88 developing countries have been grouped by income
level--low income (L) or middle income  (M).  At times the
developing countries are also disaggregated by five regicns of
location:  Mediterranean and Middle East (ME), South Asia  (SA),
East Asia  (EA), Latin America (LA), and Sub-Saharan Africa  (SS).
This produces one high income and eight developing country groups
because there are no middle income South Asia countries and only
one low inccme country in the Middle East region.  The incom,;  and
regional country groupings are displayed in Annex 1 which shows
GDP per capita in 1985 dollars for various years for each
country.  The income and regional groupings are those used by the
World Bank and are described in the 1991 World Development Report
(reference 9) and the World Tables (reference 10).  This sample
includes 35 low income and 53 middle income countries.  The
region and income group are invariant for each country.
Figure 1 shows the average level of GDP per capita for the
nine groups by year from 1960 to 1987.  The disparity between the
highest and lowest income groups in 1987 is approximately twenty-
fold ($600 to $12,000), a doubling of the ten-fold  ($600 to
$6000) disparity observed in 1960.  This doubling in range occurs
because the per capita GDP of the poorest developing country
groups have remained roughly constant while the per capita GDP of
high income countries has doubled over this period.  All of the
middle income developing country groups have grown during the
period, although not continuously, and the best performances are4
Fioure 1:  GDP Per Capita: 1960-1985
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displayed by the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia regions.
Amona low income groups, East Asia is the fastest growing region,
South Asia has the lowest levels, and Sub Sahara Africa h'ias
stagnated.
In absolute terms, Figure 1 suggests there has been
divergence rather than convergence in per capita GDP across these
groups over time.  For developing countries the range of GDP per
capita widens within both the medium and low income groupings, as
well as between them.  Rather than rely on visual evidence from
Figure 1, the coefficient of variation  (a  sample's standard
deviation as a percentage of the sample's mean) is used as a
statistic to measure convergence.  A reduction (increase) in the
coefficient of variation indicates less (more)  variation in
performance or an increase (dec-rease)  in homogeneity.
Table 1 shows the coefficient of variation and mean of GDP
per capita for various years and country groupings.  The
coefficients of variation in Table 1 indicate that per capita GDP
levels have neither converged nor diverged over time for all
countries taken together.  Convergence over time is evident for
high income countries and for middle income developing countries,
but not for low income developing countries.  GDP per capita for
all developing countries taken together has diverged somewhat
over time.  The mean values of GDP per capita in Table 1 indicate
that both high income and middle income countries have doubled
their average GDP per capita from 1960 to 1985, while low income
countries have increased their average by a fifth.  In absolute6
Table 1
GDP Per Capita--Country Groups, Various Years
Country Crouping
-- Developing Countries  High
Year  All  All  Low  Middle  Income
Coefficient of Variation
1960  95.  68.  45.  54.  32.
1970  97.  72.  44.  51.  24.
1980  93.  78.  43.  52.  20.
1985  97.  72.  45.  45.  21.
Mean Value
±960  2260  1350  730  1770  5830
1970  3090  1800  820  2470  8370
1980  4070  2490  890  3540  10730
1985  4150  2400  870  3420  11500
terms, gaps between these three income groups have widened.  In
relative term-s,  middle income countries have nearly kept pace
with high income countries while low income countries have not.
Figure 1 and Table 1 taken together offer some evidence for the
view that developing countries are separating into two groups:
one that is growing and maintaining or increasing its involvement
with the world's economy, and a second that is stagnating and
becoming progressively marginalized.  The heterogeneity of
developing countries appears to be increasing over the period
shown.
Table 2 shows for each regional and income level grouping
the average growth rates of per capita GDP over the 1960-85
period and for each decade.  It complements Figure 1 and Table 1
which cornvey  information on per capita GDP levels rather than7
Table  2
Average Growth in per capita GDP
Country Grouping  Time Periad
(Income/Region)  1960-69  1970-79  1980-85  1960-85
High  3.9  2.5  1.3  2.9
All Middle Income  3.4  3.7  -0.6  3.2
M/East Asia  4.2  4.3  1.0  4.0
M/Latin America  2.9  2.7  -2.8  2.2
M/Medit. & Mid. East  4.4  5.2  1.3  4.3
M/3ub Sahara Africa  2 5  3.6  1.0  3.2
All Low Income  1.3  0.9  -0.8  0.9
L/East  Asia  -2.7  3.3  7.5  3.7
L/Latin America  0.4  1.6  -6.3  0.3
L/South Asia  1.6  1.0  2.7  1.0
L/Sub Sahara Africa  1.3  0.7  -1.6  0.8
growth rates.  On a decadal basis, economic growth has slowed
from the sixties to the eighties for high income countries.  For
developing countries, the picture is more complicated.  Except
for Latin America, middle income developing country groups grew
faster in the seventies than in the sixties or the eighties, and
the eighties were particularly bad for Latin America and low
income Sub Saharan Africa.  The eighties were not, however, a
"lost decade" for the low income East and South Asia country
groups which experienced their highest decadal growth then.
There is some regional homogeneity, both in terms of bad
perLormance  (Sub Sahara Africa, Latin America) and good
performance  (East  Asia).  These patterns are similar to those
presented in Morawetz (Reference 6) whicI.  are based on differe:;t
economic performance measures and an overlapping but earlier
period.  Regressions of decadal growth rates on decade-starting8
GDP per capita, shown in Annex 2, yield no relation betweet.  the
two.  Growth is not random, however, and c-onomic policy
variables are strongly related to growth rates  (reference 4)
Table 3, which shows the coefficient of variation of growth
rates, reveals no tendency for growtlh  rates to ccnverge for
developing countries over time.  Within  each incoltLe  group, the
variation in country group growth rates increased over time.  For
each period shown, the coefficient of variation falls from low
income to hig}.  income groups, indicating an increase in the
homcgeneity of growth rates across income groups.
Table 3
Coefficient of Variation--Growth Rat s
Country Grouping
Developing Countries  High
Period  All  All  Low  Middle  Income
60-69  80.  91.  188.  53.  41.
70-79  107.  118.  302.  73.  43.
80-85  1320.  556.  551.  544.  80.
60-85  78.  89.  170.  56.  31.
The 1961 to 1985 average growth rate of per capita GDP for
all developing countries taken together is 2.2 percent, compared
to 2.9 percent for high income countries.  Both of these growth
rates are quite respectable when compared to the long term
historical growth rates experienced by the currently high income
countries.  For example, Kuznets (reference 5) estimated that per
capita GDP grew in the U.S. at 1.6 percent per annum from 1839 to
1961.  There is little comfort in this comparison, however, for
low income developing countries when taken as a group.1.0
be more likely to be closely associated with convergence of GDP
levels.
Sixteen social indicators drawn from the World Bank Economic
and Social Data Base and described in Social Tndicators of
Dvelovment  (reference 8) are aralyzed anc reported on in this
section, and they range from those involving few tradables  (but
probably much technological information) to those which are
essentially per capita measures of tradables.  The main issue
addressed is the extent to which these indicators exhibit
convergence in the sample of countries for which data are
available.  A secondary issue is  the extent to which convergence
occurs at low levels of GDP per capita.  The comiparators  for the
social indicators are the convergence patterns of GDP levels and
growth rates.
Three measures of convergence are used here.  The first, a
measure of bounded convergence, is based on the relation between
the social indicator and per capita GDP across countries in a
particular year.  If the social indicator approaches an asymptote
as GDP per capita increases, it is a converging indicator.  Data
are often available for several years in the 1960-88 period, such
as years of census enumeration, and the elasticity of the social
indicator with respect to per capita GDP is obtained by
regressing the social indicator on per capita GDP across all
countries in the sample in a given year.  If the elasticity
exceeds one, the indicator is growing faster than GDP and is
diverging; if the elasticity is less than one, the indicator is9
SOCIAL INDICATORS
The preceding section provides little evidence of
convergence of GDP growth and levels among developing countries
or between developing and developed countries.  Convergence of
GDP le els seems to be occurring mainly among high income and
middle income countries, and growth rates have been diverging
over time for all income groups.  The more extensive analysis of
growth in developing countries reported in Blomstrom, et al.,
(reference 2) finds little evidence of gross convergence of GDP
growth.  GDP per capita is not, however, the only performance
measure available for a country.  Numerous social indicators have
been developed to measure welfare outcomes across countries.
Analysts are beginning to use social indicators to supplament
economic measures when analyzing the impact of policy measures
(for an example, see Behrwan and Deolalikar, reference 1).
The hypothesis that GDP growth and levels should converge is
based on common access to technology and knowledge in a world
where international trade and information flows are pervasive.
This argument has been put forward by many authors and is
elaborated in Grossman and Helpman (reference 3).  This same
logic of convergence can be applied to many other measures of a
country's performance, such as health outcomes or educational
attainment.  For those performance measures that are mainly the
product of non-traded inputs, convergence of outcomes could occur
at fairly low GDP levels.  For performance measures that are
based heavily on tradable inputs, convergence of outcomes wouldconverging.  An elasticity of zero indicates no variation of the
indicator with per capita GDP and can imply strong convergence or
no relation.  Negative elasticities also generally indicate
convergence.  This measure does not capture all possible types of
convergence, but it does work well with most of the indicators
examined here.  Elasticity estimates are presented in tables in
the sections which follow.  Representative plots of each social
indicator against GDP per Capita and all regression results are
contained in Annex 3.
The second measure compares the coefficient of variation of
the social indicator for different groups of countries over time,
as was done in Tables 1 and 3 above for GDP based measures.  This
measure of variance reduction or homogenization is estimated for
each of the three country income groups  (high,  medium, and low
income) for various years with available data.  Convergence is
indicated when the coefficient of variation declines over time
for a particular country group.
The third measure of convergence is based on the disparity
in mean values of the social indicators over time across country
income groups.  A reduction in this disparity indicates that
developing countries are "catching up" with high income countries
by closing the gap.  The disparity can be measured in absolute or
proportional terms.12
DemoQraphic  Indicators
Four  demographic  indicators  are presented  in this  section.
life  expectancy;  crude  birth  rate per  thousand;  age-dependency
ratio  (0-15  & 65+ vs.  15-65);  and  the  female/male  ratio.  The
summary  statistics  are  shown  in Table  4.  Convergence  is quite
marked  for  life expectancy.  The  low elasticity  indicates  bounded
convergence  (evident  in the Annex  3 graph),  and  the coefficient
of variation  declines  over time  for most  years.  Moreover,  both
the  absolute  and  relative  gap  in life  expectancy  has  decreased
across  low, middle,  and high  income  groups.  This  is an  indicator
which  is improving  for all  income  groups  over  time,  and
particularly  for developing  countries.
Table  4
Demographic  Indicators
No.  of  Mean  Coeff.  of Var.
Year  Obs.  Elast'y.  Low  Middle  High  Low  Middle  High
Life  Expectancy
1960  103  0.21  41.3  54.1  69.4  15.  17.  2.
1970  107  0.18  45.7  58.6  72.0  14.  14.  2.
1980  108  0.16  49.5  62.7  74.4  13.  12.  2.
1985  108  0.15  51.6  64.5  75.5  13.  16.  2.
Birth  Rate  per  Thousand
1970  106  -0.38  45.8  36.8  17.0  13.  29.  16.
1980  107  -0.41  44.5  33.1  13.9  17.  31.  21.
1985  107  -0.44  43.8  31.3  12.9  19.  34.  17.
Age  Dependency  Ratio
1960  90  -0.14  0.86  0.85  0.59  9.  16.  14.
1970  100  -0.16  0.89  0.87  0.59  9.  19.  11.
1980  101  -0.19  0.89  0.79  0.54  13.  21.  10.
1985  108  -0.21  0.89  0.77  0.51  14.  22.  11.
Female/Male  Ratio
1960  102  -0.00  1.02  1.01  1.03  5.  6.  4.
1970  105  0.00  1.02  1.01  1.03  4.  5.  4.
1980  106  0.01  1.02  1.01  1.04  4.  4.  3.
1985  106  0.01  1.01  1.01  1.04  4.  4.  4.13
Birth rates and the age-dependency ratio show patterns
similar to each other and are not nearly as convergent as life
expectancy.  Both are inelastic, indicating bounded convergence,
and both show a reduction in the absolute gap between middle and
high income country groups.  But for both, the coefficient of
variation increases over time, and there is no relative gap
reduction.  There is essentially no association between the
female/male ratio and per capita GDP, which is surprising given
the longer life expectancy of females in high income economies.
The only indication of convergence is the slight reduction in the
coefficient of variation over time.  Several low income countries
have high ratios of females to males, probably due to the effects
of selective migration.
The sharp convergence in life expectancy observed in Table 4
largely results from a sharp reduction in infant and child
mortality thought to be caused by a combination of medical and
infrastructure factors such as inoculation, oral rehydration
therapy, and the provision of potable water and rudimentary waste
disposal facilities.  That is, the improvement results from a
combination of internationally available information and the use
of non tradable inputs.
Health Indicators
The health indicators are the average daily caloric intake
of food per capita, the number of hospitals per capita, and the
number of doctors per capita; summary statistics are shown in
Table 5.  Daily caloric intake is inelastic with respect to per14
capita GDP and exhibiL.s  bounded convergenc'e. The coefficient of
variation falls slightly over time except for the low income
group.  The absolute gap is constant between low and high income
groups and decreases between middle and high income groups.  The
relative gaps decrease.  Improved nutrition may well have played
a supporting role in increasing life expectancy.
Table 5
Health Indicators
No. of  Mean  Coeff. of Var.
Year  Obs.  Elast'y.  Low  Middle  High  Low  Middle  High
Daily Caloric Intake
1961  98  0.18  2000  2250  3130  11.  15.  8.
1970  101  0.16  2120  2430  3220  8.  16.  7.
1980  102  0.16  2160  2610  3320  9.  15.  7.
1986  102  0.16  2190  2670  3330  11.  15.  6.
Per Capita Hospital Beds
1960  95  0.93  .001  .003  .010  97.  59.  24.
1970  99  0.92  .001  .004  .011  79.  69.  22.
1980  49  0.91  - - - - - -
Per Capita Doctors
1960  97  1.42  .0001  .0004  .0012  106.  86.  22.
1970  102  1.35  .0001  .0005  .0014  88.  92.  18.
1980  49  1.27  - - - - -
Per capita hospital beds and doctors exhibit similar
patterns in Table 5.  Both increase in proportion or more rapidly
with per capita GDP and are not bounded.  The coefficient of
variation decreases over time only for high and low income
groups, and there is little evidence for either that absolute
gaps decline.  The relative gap declines for both indicators
between middle and high income groups.  These relations, when
compared to life expectancy, suggest that additional doctors and15
hospital beds per capita have contributed little to the observed
increase in life expectancy.
Education/Literacy Indicators
The major education indicator is  the primary school
enrollment ratio, which is the proportion of children of
elementary school age who are actually enrolled.  Other measures
which included attendance would be preferable, but are available
for very few countries.  Direct measures of literacy are also
available for relatively few countries, and a distant proxy,
daily newspaper circulation per capita, is used instead.  The
summary statistics for these two indicators are shown in Table 6.
Table 6
Education/Literacy Indicators
No. of  Mean  Coeff. of Var.
Year  Obs.  Elastly.  Low  Middle  High  Low  Middle  High
Primary School Enrollment Rate
1960  97  0.50  40.  81.  110.  68.  30.  12.
1970  95  0.39  54.  90.  104.  52.  24.  10.
1980  101  0.22  72.  98.  102.  44.  18.  5.
Per Capita Newspaper Circulation
1960  72  1.96  .010  .058  .331  149.  76.  33.
1970  66  1.74  .014  .069  .333  132.  84.  35.
1979  80  1.51  .013  .069  .357  112.  85.  35.
1985  84  1.61  .016  .074  .347  111.  81.  41.
It is obvious from Table 6 that there is strong convergence
of primary school enrollment ratios as per capita GDP rises.
Moreover, the reduction in elasticities over time suggests that
the degree of convergence has been increasing strongly over the
years shown.  The coefficient of variation has declined over time16
for all income groups, and both absolute and relative gaps have
decreased.
The results for daily per capita newspaper circulation
suggest that this indicator bears little relation to literacy,
but probably is a better measure of the availability of
information.  Over the years shown this indicator grew faster
than per capita GDP and is not bounded.  The coefficient of
variation decreases over time only for the low income group.
There is no reduction in the absolute gap across income groups,
but the relative gap decreases.
Urbanization Indicator
Urbanization is often characterized as the handmaiden of
development, and the summary statistics shown in Table 7 support
this.  The percent of the population living in urban areas has
become more inelastic with GDP over time, and the coefficient of
variation has declined for all income groups over time.
Moreover, both the absolute and relative gaps have decreased.  It
is difficult to give a direct welfare interpretation to
Table 7
Urbanization Indicator
No. of  Mean  Coeff. of Var.
Year  Obs.  Elastly.  Low  Middle  High  Low  Middle  High
Population Percent Urban
1960  101  0.84  12.7  35.3  66.7  59.  48.  22.
1970  106  0.70  16.6  40.9  72.6  52.  41.  17.
1980  108  0.56  21.2  47.2  76.0  46.  36.  15.
1985  108  0.50  24.2  50.3  77.0  45.  33.  15.17
urbanization, but we know that it has many positive indirect
effects.  For example, children in urban areas are more likely to
attend school than are children in rural areas.  In addition,
health care is more readily available in urban areas than rural
areas.
Labor Force Indicator
Table 8 shows the summary statistics for labor force
participation rates.  There is essentially no relation with GDP
and no convergence.  There is no tendency for the coefficient of
variation to decrease over time, although it is markedly smaller
for high income countries than for developing countries.  The
means show rates falling for low income countries while they are
rising  for  middle and high income countries.
Table 9
Labor Force Indicators
No. of  Mean  Coeff. of Var.
Year  Obs.  Elastly.  Low  Middle  High  Low  Middle  High
Labor Force Participation Rate
1960  101  -0.06  46.4  36.1  42.3  18.  21.  9.
1970  104  -0.04  44.5  35.4  42.6  19.  21.  10.
1980  105  -0.00  42.9  36.5  45.3  18.  20.  11.
1985  105  0.02  42.0  39.0  46.5  18.  19.  11.
Examination of labor force participation data suggests that
there are measurement inconsistencies with respect to
agricultural workers in countries with low incomes.  In some
countries it appears that household members working on family
plots are recorded as members of the labor force while in other
countries they are not.  This measurement problem may interactlb
with cultural factors.  In Moslem countries, for example, women
working in agriculture on family owned plots may not be recorded
as being in the labor force.
ConsumRtion Indicators
Three measures of consumption--per capita energy use, per
capita telephones, and per capita cars--are shown in Table 9.
Each of them increases much more  -an linearly with per capita
Tabl.  S
Consumption Indicators
No. of  Mears  Coeff. of Var.
Year  Obs.  Elast'y.  Low  Middle  High  Low  Middle  High
Per Capita Energy Consumption
1961  95  1.74  58.  511.  2430.  132.  176.  55.
1970  100  1.68  110.  761.  3880.  134.  130.  46.
1980  103  1.54  129.  976.  4490.  127.  105.  46.
1985  103  1.54  116.  983.  4620.  118.  95.  46.
Per Capita Telephones
1975  83  1.82  .005  .050  .398  126.  90.  36.
1980  76  1.77  .004  .074  .509  66.  90.  30.
1985  61  1.74  .008  .109  .629  116.  93.  25.
Per Capita Cars
1960  96  1.69  .003  .013  .107  131.  110.  75.
1970  102  1.70  .004  .024  .221  116.  108.  37.
1980  91  1.74  .004  .048  .331  76.  92.  24.
1985  58  1.90  - - - - -
GDP.  In the case of cars, the relation is becoming more income
elastic or divergent over time.  The high elasticity of these
thrue items is not surprising because each are tradable goods
whose prices do not vary much with per capita GDP.
The coefficient of variation declines over time for energy
use and cars per capita, but not for telephones per capita.  The
absolute gap between income groups does not decrease for any of19
t  t~jhree  items;  the  relative  gap  between  the  middle  and  high
income  groups  declines  for telephones  and  cars.
Central  Government  Expenditure  Indicators
Table  10 shows  summary  statistics  for two  categories  of
central  government  expenditures,  defense  and  social  services.
The  latter  includes  expenditures  on social  security  and  welfare.
For  each  the  expenditures  are  measured  in percent  of GNP.  The
lack  of a relation  between  defense  expenditure  share  and  per
capita  GDP  is typical  of many  other  categories  of central
government  expenditure.  Social  expenditures  are  the  major
exception  to this  pattern  and tend  to  '.ncrease  more  than
proportionally  with  GDP  per  capita.  The  growth  of  social
Table  10
Central  Government  Expenditure  Indicators
No.  of  Mean  Coeff.  of Var.
Year  Obs.  Elast'y.  Low  Middle  High  Low  Middle  High
Defense  Expenditures/GNP
1975  67  0.02  .025  .030  .025  68.  100.  49.
1980  66  0.00  .024  .033  .026  60.  97.  44.
1985  70  0.05  .025  .033  .026  72.  99.  52.
Social  Expenditure/GNP
1980  65  1.25  .008  .037  .133  147.  94.  40.
1985  65  1.23  .011  .043  .139  113.  101.  34.
expenditures  with  per  capita  GDP  is strong  enough  to impart  an
upward  trend  in the  relation  between  all government  expenditures
and  per  capita  GDP.  Defense  expenditures  show  no convergence  by
any  measure  in Table  10.  For  social  expenditures,  the
coefficient  of variation  decrease  over time  for low  and  high20
income groups, and the relative gap also decreases between these
two income groups.
CONCLUSIO1'
In the past three decades, differences in GDP per capita
levels across low, middle, and high income countries have
increased, and the range of GDP per capita growth rates
experienced by developing countries have widened as well.
Table 11 summarizes the three measures of convergence used
for GDP level and growth and compares them with similar measures
for sixteen social indicators.  GDP levels and growth rates show
very modest evidence of convergence.  Four social indicators--
life expectancy, caloric intake, primary enrollment ratios, and
urbanization--show evidence of convergence for every measure.
The first three of these are fairly direct measures of human
welfare.  Two  social indicators--labor force participation rates
and defense expenditures as a proportion of GNP--show no evidence
of convergence by any measure used.  The remaining ten social
indicators show some evidence of convergence, with social
expenditures as a percent of GNP being the next most convergent
of the remaining indicators.
The "convergence club" of high income countries established
in the productivity area clearly extends to social indicators.
The convergence counts at the bottom of Table 11 show that the
coefficient of variation declines more frequently for the high21
Table 11
Summary of Convergence Measures
Bounded  Coeff. of Variatn.  Gap Falls?
vs. GDP?  Falls for Group?  Absolute  Relative
Indicator  (inelastic)  L  M  H  L-H  M-H  L-H  M-H
Productivity
GDP  Level  ...  - +  +  - - - =
GDP  Growth  +  - -
Social Indicators
Life  Expectancy  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +
birth  Rate  +  - - - - +  - -
Age  Depend.  Ratio  +  - +  - +  - -
Female/Male  Ratio  - +  +  +  - - - -
Caloric  Intake  +  - +  +  =  +  +  +
PC Hosp.  Beds  +  - +  - - - +
PC  Doctors  +  - +  - - - +
Primary  Enrollmt.  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +
PC  Newspapers  - +  - - - - +  +
Urbanization  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +
Lab.  Force  Part.  -
PC  Energy  - +  +  +  - - - -
PC Telephones  - - - +  - - - +
PC  Cars  - +  +  +  - - - +
Defense  Exp/GNP  -
Soc.  Exp/GNP  - +  - +  - - +  +
Social Indicator
Convergence Count  6  10  7  12  3  6  6  10
Key:  +  is yes;  - is no or none;  =  is unchanged.
income group than for the other two income groups, although its
extent of convergence is followed closely by that for the low
income group.  The middle income group is, however, more likely
to close the gap with high income countries than is the low
income group.  The high and low income groups are becoming more
homogeneous over time in terms of their social indicator levels,
while the middle income group is becoming more like the high
income group.  Needless to say, this type of convergence--22
increased homogeneity but at low social indicator levels--is not
a benign result for low income developing countries.
Some of the convergence in social indicators may be related
to the convergence of productivity levels.  This linkage may hold
for high income countries, but it is insufficient for the low
income countries because their productivity levels are not
converging.  Although social indicator levels are often closely
related to GDP levels (witness the regressions in Annex 3), other
factors are clearly at work here in addition to GDP levels.  The
transmission of knowledge, information, and new technology across
national boundaries likely plays an important role in the
convergence of many social indicators.
Finally, low income developing countries clearly have ample
room for improvement in terms of the convergent social indicators
that reflect human welfare outcomes.  Improvement in these
indicators can be obtained by increasing GDP levels in these
countries and also by other types of interventions that directly
enhance these measures.  If the goal of economic development  is
to promote human welfare, a redoubled effort and focus on low
income developing countries is warranted.23
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Annex 1:  Countries Included in the Analysis
Heston-Summers  GDP Per capita  (1985  international  prices)
Economy  Type  PCGDP  PCGDP  PCGDP  PCGDP
1960  1970  1980  1985
China  L-EA  723  895  1263  1883
Indonesia  L-EA  803  1430  1704
Haiti  L-LA  921  833  1051  924
Guyana  L-LA  1630  1785  1939  1265
Nepal  L-SA  584  630  686  729
Sri Lanka  L-SA  1389  1438  1584  1962
India  L-SA  617  666  628  696
Pakistan  L-SA  820  1154  1141  1452
Burma  L-SA  341  461  564  659
Bangladesh  L-SA  621  642  671  700
Liberia  L-SS  957  1210  1178  943
Nigeria  L-SS  1133  1237  1555  1066
Burundi  L-SS  473  368  482  539
Mali  L-SS  541  416  511  486
Zaire  L-SS  379  473  349  358
Zambia  L-SS  1172  1311  900  762
Somalia  L-SS  891  685  850  843
Sierra  Leone  L-SS  871  1352  1160  1017
Niger  L-SS  604  871  798  625
Sudan  L-SS  975  1035  1077  946
Central  Afr Rep  L-SS  806  844  780  699
Mauritania  L-SS  930  1180  1135  926
Ghana  L-SS  1049  1130  995  852
Burkina  Faso  L-SS  397  463  510
Kenya  L-SS  635  730  958  845
Tanzania  L-SS  272  379  507  480
Malawi  L-SS  423  536  614  575
Rwanda  L-SS  538  603  699  731
Lesotho  L-SS  346  515  1271  1236
Ethiopia  L-SS  262  315  343  325
Benin  L-SS  1075  1090  1068  1103
Madagaskar  L-SS  1013  1043  862  677
Gambia  L-SS  411  564  682  725
Togo  L-SS  411  672  871  665
Uganda  L-SS  371  402  230  430
Taiwan  M-EA  964  1833  3786  4524
Thailand  M-EA  985  1487  2129  2516
Papua  New  Guinea  M-EA  1136  2212  1844  1669
Malaysia  M-EA  1783  2441  4427  4751
Korea  M-EA  923  1722  3033  3858
Fiji  M-EA  2354  2815  4023  3517
Philippines  M-EA  1183  1488  2028  1749
Bolivia  M-LA  1142  1578  1835  156625
Aiiiiex  I  (contintied)
Honduras  M-LA  901  1122  1413  1240
P;raguay  M-LA  1200  1431  2550  2345
Chile  M-LA  3103  3915  4234  3763
PerL'  M-LA  2130  2906  3187  2730
Colombia  M-LA  1874  2387  3332  3300
El Salvador  M-LA  1305  1672  1867  1766
Jamaica  M-LA  1829  2936  2468  2381
Brazil  M-LA  1404  2540  4499  3995
Dominican Rep  M-LA  1227  1623  2265  2101
Argentina  M-LA  3381  4366  4614  3982
Panama  M-LA  1533  2579  3442  3655
Guatemala  M-LA  1667  2034  2637  2200
Mexico  M-LA  2870  4061  5758  5332
Venezuela  M-LA  3899  4903  6938  5660
Costa Rica  M-LA  2160  3007  3982  3611
Uruguay  M-LA  4401  4548  5948  4521
Barbados  M-LA  3443  5761  7124  6152
Ecuador  M-LA  1461  1818  3158  2775
Nicaragua  M-LA  1756  2594  2258  1890
Trinidad & Tobago  M-LA  4754  6264  11212  7478
Yemen Arab Rep  M-ME  502  1297  14115
Jordan  M-ME  1328  1600  2548  2731
Cyprus  M-ME  2039  3996  5767  6905
Poland  M-ME  4238  3817
Hungary  M-ME  2988  4989  5170
Yugoslavia  M-ME  1690  2932  4607  4485
Egypt  M-ME  557  795  1522  1932
Algeria  M-ME  1676  1793  3015  3209
Greece  M-ME  1889  3798  5478  5712
Portugal  M-ME  1618  2919  4500  4535
Tunisia  M-ME  1394  1773  2963  3104
Malta  M-ME  1516  2628  4979  5766
Morocco  M-ME  854  1407  1967  2013
Syria  M-ME  1787  2418  5208  5016
Turkey  M-ME  1669  2293  3003  3204
Gabon  M-SS  1373  2693  3883  4210
Cameroon  M-SS  736  1023  1515  1792
Mauritius  M-SS  2113  2129  3469  3756
South Africa  M-SS  2984  4233  4619  4407
Congo  M-SS  1092  1570  1948  2647
Senegal  M-SS  1136  1184  1202  1156
Seychelles  M-SS  3646  3597
Botswana  M-SS  474  863  1881  2555
Cote D' Ivorie  M-SS  1021  1447  1806  1447
Zimbabwe  M-SS  937  1006  1403  1434
Netherland,  The  HI  5587  8505  10632  10937
Finland  HI  4718  7259  9970  11225
New Zealand  HI  7222  8581  9189  1013826
A  nnexi  A  l  (CO-ntinued)
Iceland  Hi  5352  6991  11833  11900
Canada  Hil  7758  10668  13768  15013
France  Hi  5344  8536  11148  11376
United States  HI  9983  12923  15310  16779
Belgium  HI  5207  7859  10499  10458
Australia  HfI  7204  9978  11715  12550
Sweden  Hi  6483  9279  10910  12382
Switzerland  Hi  9313  12688  14143  14390
Italy  Hi  4375  6937  9986  10584
Germany,  Fed Rep  HI  6038  8664  10993  11646
Ireland  HI  3214  4865  6183  6008
Spain  Hi  2701  5208  6514  6433
Austria  HI  4476  6781  9616  10291
Luxembourg  Hi  6970  8966  11265  12382
Denmark  HI  5900  8556  10322  11980
United Kingdom  HI  6370  8006  9680  10679
Norway  HI  5443  7761  11956  13495
Japan  Hi  2701  6688  9615  1078127
Annex 2:  Regressions  and Graph of Growth Rates vs. Initial GDP Per Capita
Growth  Rates
Year  No. of  Elasticity  Std.  error  T ratio  Intercept  R sqr
countries  of elasticity
Growth  Rates  of GDP
1960-85  91  0.13  0.09  1.35  -0.16  0.02
1960-69  94  0.15  0.10  1.59  -0.20  0.03
1970-79  87  - 0.01  0.08  -0.18  1.10  ( 00
1980-85  49  - 0.20  0.12  -1.73  2.17  0.06
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Annex 3:  Regressions and Graphs of Social Indicators vs. GDP Per Capita
Demographic  Indicators
…-----------------------------------------------------__---------------------__
Year  No.  of  Elasticity  Std.  error  T ratio  Intercept  R sqr
countries  of elasticity
…--------------------------------------  -----------------------  __----------  _- __
Life  Expectancy
1960  103  0.21  0.02  13.31  2.40  0.64
1970  107  0.18  0.01  16.20  2.63  0.71
1980  108  0.16  0.01  18.62  2.82  0.77
1985  108  0.15  0.01  19.53  2.93  0.78
Mortality Rate
1987  92  -1.01  0.05  -20.58  11.86  0.82
1988  85  -0.98  0.04  -25.89  11.67  0.89
Birth Rate Per Thousand
1970  106  -0.38  0.02  -15.24  6.36  0.69
1980  107  -0.41  0.03  -15.95  6.62  0.71
1985  107  -0.44  0.03  -17.32  6.76  0.74
Age Dependency  Ratio
1960  90  -0.14  0.02  -7.14  0.80  0.37
1970  100  -0.16  0.02  -8.53  0.96  0.43
1980  101  -0.19  0.02  -12.10  1.19  0.60
1985  108  -0.21  0.02  -14.25  1.37  0.66
Female  Male  Ratio
1960  102  -0.001  0.006  -0.10  0.02  0.000
1970  105  0.002  0.004  0.46  0.00  0.002
1980  106  0.006  0.004  1.45  -0.03  0.020
1985  106  0.007  0.004  1.94  -0.04  0.035
…-----------------------------___---_-------_--------------------__----------__29
Annex  3 (continued)
Health  Indicators
Year  No.  of  Elasticity  Std.  error  T ratio  Intercept  R sqr
countries  of elasticity
Daily  Calorie  intake
1961  98  0.18  0.01  12.51  6.42  0.62
1970  101  0.16  0.01  13.63  6.59  0.65
1980  102  0.16  0.01  15.11  6.63  0.70
1985  102  0.16  0.01  14.86  6.64  0.69
Per Capita  Hospitals
1960  95  0.93  0.08  11.93  --12.81  0.60
1970  99  0.92  0.07  13.64  -12.94  0.66
1980  49  0.91  0.10  8.74  -13.19  0.62
Per  Capita  Doctors
1960  97  1.42  0.09  15.09  -18.95  0.71
1970  102  1.35  0.07  19.03  -18.64  0.78
1980  49  1.27  0.10  12.25  -17.98  0.76
Education/Literacy  Indicators
Year  No. of  Elasticity  Std.  error  T ratio  Intercept  R sqr
countries  of elasticity
…________________-…-_  _  -…  _  -_____…__________------------…
Primary  School  Enrollment  Ratio
1960  97  0.50  0.06  7.83  0.49  0.39
1970  95  0.39  0.05  7.95  1.28  0.40
1980  101  0.22  0.03  7.07  2.71  0.34
Per Capita  Newspaper  Circulation
1960  72  1.96  0.16  12.46  -18.11  0.69
1970  66  1.74  0.12  14.53  -16.70  0.77
1979  80  1.51  0.10  14.68  -15.17  0.75
1985  84  1.61  0.11  15.26  -16.05  0.72




Year  No.  of  Elasticity  Std.  error  T ratio  Intercept  R sqr
countries  of elasticity
Population  Percent  Urban
1960  101  0.84  0.06  13.06  -2.98  0.63
1970  106  0.70  0.04  15.51  -1.88  0.70
1980  108  0.56  0.04  15.38  -0.79  0.69
1985  108  0.50  0.04  13.74  -0.20  0.64
Labor  Force  Indicators
Year  No.  of  Elasticity  Std.  error  T ratio  Intercept  R sqr
countries  of elasticity
Labor  Force  Participation  Rate
1960  101  -0.06  0.02  -2.61  4.14  0.06
1970  104  -0.04  0.02  -1.73  3.95  0.03
1980  105  -0.00  0.02  -0.06  3.69  0.00
1985  105  0.02  0.02  1.27  3.49  0.0231
Annex  3 (continued!
Consumption  Indicators
Year  No. of  Elasticity  Std.  error  T ratio  Intercept  R sqr
countries  of elasticity
Per Capita  Energy  Consumption
1961  95  1.74  0.11  16.23  -7.54  0.74
1970  100  1.68  0.07  22.59  -6.98  0.84
1980  103  1.54  0.06  26.85  -5.93  0.88
1985  103  1.54  0.05  29.92  -5.94  0.90
Per Capita  Telephones
1975  83  1.82  0.06  28.96  -17.78  0.92
1980  76  1.77  0.07  26.09  -17.34  0.90
1985  61  1.74  0.08  20.79  -16.79  0.88
Per Capita  Cars
1960  96  1.69  0.11  15.23  -17.32  0.71
1970  102  1.70  0.07  24.24  -17.14  0.85
1980  91  1.74  0.07  23.71  -17 47  0.86
1985  58  1.90  0.10  19.41  -18.76  0.87
Central  Government  Expenditure  Indicators
…  ----------------  ----------  ----------------- …
Year  No.  of  Elasticity  Std.  error  T ratio  Intercept  R sqr
countries  of elasticity
______  _  - -_…-------------…
Defense  ExpendituresIGNP
1975  67  0.02  0.12  0.14  -4.07  0.00
1980  66  0.00  0.10  0.03  -3.87  0.00
1985  70  0.05  0.09  0.54  -4.22  0.00
Social  Expenditures/GNP
1980  65  1.25  0.13  9.75  -13.91  0.60
1985  65  1.23  0.27  4.59  -13.13  0.25
…---------  - ---------- …  - …-…---  - -----  ---------  _____________32
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